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ABSTRACT—When the perceptual system uses color to fa-
cilitate object recognition, itmust solve the color-constancy
problem: The light an object reflects to an observer’s eyes
confounds properties of the source of the illumination with
the surface reflectance of the object. Information from the
visual scene (bottom-up information) is insufficient to solve
this problem.We show that observers use world knowledge
about objects and their prototypical colors as a source of
top-down information to improve color constancy. Specifi-
cally, observers use world knowledge to recalibrate their
color categories.Our results also suggest that similar effects
previously observed in language perception are the con-
sequence of a general perceptual process.
Observers can use color to identify objects (Brainard, 2004;
Oliva & Schyns, 2000; Tanaka, Weiskopf, & Williams, 2001).
Here, we show that the reverse is also true: Observers can use
objects to identify color. Knowledge about an object’s proto-
typical color influences perception of instances of that object.
The same hue is categorized as yellow when viewed on a banana,
but as orange when viewed on a carrot. More important, this
categorization bias also affects the perception of other, color-
neutral objects (i.e., artificial objects that can have different
colors, such as socks and cars). Observers who see a banana with
an ambiguous hue between yellow and orange later categorize
this hue on a color-neutral object as yellow; observers who see a
carrot with the same ambiguous hue later categorize the hue as
orange.
This top-down flow of world knowledge influencing percep-
tion is one way in which observers might achieve color constancy,
the ability to see an object as having the same color despite
differing illumination conditions. Achieving color constancy is a
perceptual challenge because the light that reaches the eye
confounds illumination with the surface reflectance of an object.
To use color information for object recognition, observers need
to compensate for the influence of illumination and see the color
of an object as invariant over illumination conditions. Such
compensation is made possible, in part, by using bottom-up
information available from the image itself, such as global and
local spectral means of the light, as well as the maximal inten-
sities (Kraft & Brainard, 1999) and brightness-hue correlations
in the image (Golz & MacLeod, 2002). Generally, color con-
stancy is less than perfect because these sources of information
are not always available (Brainard, 2004; Kraft & Brainard,
1999). The degree of color constancy achieved also depends on
whether observers are explicitly instructed to focus on color
constancy (Arend & Reeves, 1986; Troost & de Weert, 1991).
Color constancy could, in principle, be improved by a top-down
flow of world knowledge. In the experiments we report here, we
found evidence for such a mechanism: Knowledge about objects’
natural colors is used to recalibrate color categories. That is,
objects are used to identify colors.
Observers use world knowledge when judging the hue and
brightness of an object (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegen-
furtner, 2006; Levin & Banaji, 2006). We replicated this finding
in a pilot experiment, in which 12 members of the Max Planck
Institute’s subject pool participated for pay. All were native
speakers of Dutch and had normal color vision. Participants
were seated in a booth, where they viewed line drawings of a
banana, a carrot, and a sock in the following seven hues (in
International Commission on Illumination, CIE, XYZ values):
Hue 1: 53.2, 42.1, 5.8; Hue 2: 54.3, 45.4, 6.3; Hue 3: 56.0, 49.0,
7.0; Hue 4: 57.8, 53.1, 7.7; Hue 5: 59.7, 57.4, 8.4; Hue 6: 61.8,
62.2, 9.3; Hue 7: 64.2, 67.3, 10.2. Participants were instructed
that on each trial, they should press the right button of a two-
button box if they perceived the object as orange and the left
button if they perceived the object as yellow. Each of the three
objects was presented 15 times in each of the seven hues, for a
total of 315 trials. Analysis of the results revealed, in addition to
the trivial effect of hue (bhue5 10.2, prep > .99; see the Results
section of Experiment 1 for the statistical method used), that
there were significantly more ‘‘yellow’’ responses for the banana
than for the sock (bobject5banana5 0.88, prep> .99, with the sock
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condition mapped on the intercept) and fewer ‘‘yellow’’ re-
sponses for the carrot than for the sock (bobject5carrot 5 0.45,
prep 5 .988; see Fig. 1).
These results are, by themselves, not evidence for top-down
processing; they show only that bottom-up information is merged
with world knowledge to achieve an optimal perceptual decision
(Massaro, 1998; Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2000). To be evi-
dence for a true top-down effect, results would have to show that
world knowledge about object A influences the perception of a
neutral object B (Pitt & McQueen, 1998; Samuel & Pitt, 2003).
For instance, is the likelihood that an observer will perceive a
yellowish sock as yellow increased if the observer has recently
seen a banana in the same yellowish hue?
EXPERIMENT 1
To find a true top-down effect, we designed an experiment with
three phases. In the first phase (exposure phase), participants
viewed colored line drawings of prototypically yellow and
prototypically orange objects, presented in an achromatic con-
text (see the left-hand side of Fig. 2): For half of the observers,
the prototypically orange objects were shown in what our pilot
experiment indicated was a good orange, and the prototypically
yellow objects were shown in a hue that was ambiguous between
yellow and orange; for the other half of the observers, the
prototypically orange objects were shown in the same ambigu-
ous hue, and the prototypically yellow objects were shown in a
good yellow. Participants were asked to remember which objects
they saw, so color was irrelevant to their task. In the second, and
critical, phase (color-categorization phase), the participants’
task was to judge whether a sock (an object without a proto-
typical color) was yellow or orange. This task was introduced as a
mere filler intended to produce a time delay between the picture-
encoding task and a later memory test; this should have dis-
couraged observers from using explicit strategies relating the
stimuli in the two tasks. None of the participants questioned this
cover story. In the third, and final, stage of the experiment (mem-
ory phase), object names were presented one at a time, and par-
ticipants indicated whether each name corresponded to one of
the pictures they had seen during the first phase.
Method
Participants
Fifty-two members of the Max Planck Institute’s subject pool
participated in the experiment for payment (h4). All were native























Fig. 1. Results from the pilot experiment: percentage of trials on which the color of the line
drawing was categorized as yellow, as a function of the object depicted (banana, sock, or carrot)
and its hue (seven hues of the yellow-orange continuum).
Fig. 2. Examples (in the ambiguous hue) of pictures used in the exposure
phase of Experiments 1 and 2. The pictures on the left (Experiment 1)
have a prototypical color (orange for a goldfish and yellow for a banana),
whereas the pictures on the right (Experiment 2) have no prototypical
color.
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Stimuli and Procedure
We prepared line drawings of 24 objects: 11 prototypically or-
ange objects, 12 prototypically yellow objects, and 1 object with
both prototypically yellow and prototypically orange parts (a
rubber duck). Of the 11 prototypically orange objects, 8 were
natural (carrot, mandarin orange, pumpkin, lobster, goldfish,
orangutan, egg yolk, beak of a swan), and 3 were artificial (traffic
cone, EasyJet plane, basketball). Of the 12 prototypically yellow
objects, 10 were natural (lemon, pineapple, banana, bee, chick,
canary, wasp, daisy, sunflower, dandelion), and 2 were artificial
(tennis ball, Dutch train). The prototypically yellow parts of the
objects were presented in what the pilot experiment showed to
be a good yellow (Hue 7) or in an ambiguous color (Hue 4). The
prototypically orange parts of the objects were presented in what
the pilot experiment showed to be a good orange (Hue 1) or in the
same ambiguous color. The background and the nonprototypi-
cally yellow and orange parts of the objects were achromatic.
Half of the participants saw the prototypically orange objects in
the ambiguous hue and the prototypically yellow objects in the
good yellow, and the other half saw the prototypically orange
objects in the good orange and the prototypically yellow objects
in the ambiguous hue. The first group, which saw the good yellow
on yellow objects, was expected to develop an orange bias (i.e., a
bias to categorize the ambiguous color as orange); the second
group, which saw the good orange on orange objects, was ex-
pected to develop a yellow bias (i.e., a bias to categorize the
ambiguous color as yellow).
Participants were seated in a sound-attenuated and shaded
cubicle; the only light was provided by the computer monitor.
They received instructions via the computer screen. Each of the
24 objects was presented three times in the exposure phase, and
participants could view each image as long as they wanted while
they were trying to memorize it. Instructions in the color-cate-
gorization phase were identical to those in the pilot experiment.
Participants categorized each of five hues (shown on a sock)
20 times. These were the same hues as in the pilot experiment
minus the two endpoints of the seven-step continuum. In the
final, memory phase, the names of 24 objects and 24 related
lures (e.g., trolley was a lure for train) were presented, and
participants had to indicate whether or not they had seen each
object before.
Results and Discussion
We analyzed the data using linear mixed-effects models (Baa-
yen, Davidson, & Bates, in press) in which individual data points
were predicted with fixed experimental effects that were crossed
with a participants random effect. This approach made averag-
ing the data superfluous, which increased the statistical power
and allowed us to use trial-specific covariates, such as trial
number. Moreover, by using a logistic linking function, we could
accommodate the categorical nature of the dependent variable,
as well as the typical sigmoid shape of categorization functions.
Hue was entered as a continuous predictor, and object identity
was entered as a categorical predictor. For categorical predic-
tors in such models, one level is mapped on the intercept, and
other levels are coded as binary dummy variables. Continuous
predictors were scaled to range from 0 to 1. The value of the
coefficient thus indicates how the logarithm of the odds (log
odds) for a ‘‘yellow’’ response changes with a change in condition
for a categorical predictor and the degree to which the log odds
for a ‘‘yellow’’ response changes within the range of a numerical
predictor.
Exposure to the ambiguous hue on either prototypically yel-
low or prototypically orange objects affected the perception of
hues on the color-neutral sock in the critical color-categoriza-
tion task. Participants who had seen an ambiguous hue on
prototypically yellow objects and had seen orange objects in a
good orange identified the ambiguous hues in the middle of the
test continuum as yellow more often than did participants who
had seen the ambiguous color on prototypically orange objects
(byellow bias5 1.64, prep5 .980, with the orange-bias, or good-
yellow, group mapped on the intercept; see Fig. 3a). The overall
effect of exposure got smaller over the course of the color-
categorization task (bYellow Bias  Trial 5 1.58, prep 5 .997; see
Fig. 3b, in which trials were grouped into five blocks) and was
larger for participants who took longer to encode the objects in
the exposure phase (bYellow Bias  Encoding Time 5 6.09, prep 5
.957) and for participants who better remembered which objects
were shown (bYellow Bias  Recognition Accuracy58.67, prep> .969).
As Figure 3a shows, group differences were found for Hues 3
and 4, but not Hue 5. Apparently, this latter hue is too close to
the prototype of the category ‘‘yellow,’’ so it is inoculated against
top-down influences. This explanation is supported by the re-
sults from the pilot experiment, in which the effects of object
identity were also strongest for Hues 3 and 4, and nearly absent
for Hue 5.
In demonstrations of direct effects of world knowledge on
color perception—as in our pilot experiment, when participants
judged the hue of a banana and a carrot—the stimuli activate
concepts such as ‘‘yellow’’ and ‘‘orange.’’ The activation of these
concepts can then influence the decision-making process—and
hence the results—without influencing perception itself. Such
an effect was not possible with the neutral stimulus used in
the current experiment, because the picture of a sock does not
differentially activate the concepts ‘‘yellow’’ and ‘‘orange.’’
Thus, it is difficult to argue that the observed effect occurred at
the level of decision making. The recalibration of the color
categories is therefore most parsimoniously explained as a top-
down recalibration of perception due to the prior exposure.
An alternative account would be that, on seeing a banana with
an ambiguous hue, participants decided that they apparently
had to call such a hue ‘‘yellow’’ in this experiment. We have two
objections to such an account, a theoretical one and an empirical
one. From a theoretical point of view, we argue that top-down
recalibration helps to achieve perceptual invariance in the face
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of ecological variance, and adjusting a decision criterion would
not help to reduce ecological variance. Note that such a func-
tional argument holds only for a delayed feedback effect, as in
the current case, because on-line feedback is not beneficial for
optimal perception (Norris et al., 2000, pp. 301–306). On an
empirical level, it is difficult to explain the gradual decline of the
recalibration effect over the testing blocks on the basis of this
alternative account. A criterion-shift account predicts that the
effect should be stable over the course of the experiment, and
leaves unexplained why participants reshifted their criterion
during the color-categorization phase. In contrast, a top-down
recalibration would have been weakened gradually as category
boundaries were gradually updated during exposure to better ex-
amples (i.e., the endpoints of the test continuum) of the color cate-
gories in the color-categorization phase.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 1, participants were exposed to different limited
ranges of hues, either a range from good yellow to the ambiguous
hue or a range from the ambiguous hue to good orange. There-
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Fig. 3. Results from the color-categorization phase in Experiments 1 (objects with a prototypical
color) and 2 (objects without a prototypical color). The graphs show the percentage of ‘‘yellow’’ re-
sponses as a function of (a) hue and (b) test block in Experiment 1 and as a function of (c) hue in Ex-
periment 2.
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(or range) effect, in which the ambiguous hue was perceived as
different from the good yellow or orange. Such pure adaptation
effects in the absence of a top-down influence have been ob-
served in both speech and color perception (Bornstein & Korda,
1985). In our second experiment, we tested this possibility by




Fifty-two members of the Max Planck Institute’s subject pool
participated in the experiment for payment (h4). All were native
speakers of Dutch and had normal color vision. None of them
had participated in Experiment 1.
Stimuli and Procedure
The procedure included the same three phases as in Experiment
1, the only change being in the exposure phase. The ranges of
hues from the previous experiment were tested, but they were
presented on objects without a prototypical color (see the right-
hand side of Fig. 2). For instance, the banana was replaced by a
crayon, which has a similar shape but no prototypical color. The
ratio of colored surface to achromatic surface in each picture
was similar to the ratio for the corresponding prototypically
colored object in Experiment 1. Again, half of the participants
viewed objects in good yellow or an ambiguous hue, and the
other half viewed objects in good orange or the same ambiguous
hue. If the effect of exposure in the first experiment was due to a
range effect, a similar effect would be expected in this experiment.
Results and Discussion
As Figure 3c shows, there was no difference between the group
with good-yellow exposure (i.e., the orange-bias group) and the
group with good-orange exposure (byellow bias5 0.05, prep5 .535,
with the orange-bias group mapped on the intercept). Therefore,
the results of Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to an adaptation
effect. Exposure to good yellow and ambiguous orange on ob-
jects without an intrinsic color does not lead to a recalibration in
color categorization. Hence, the effect found in Experiment 1
must have been due to conceptual knowledge, and cannot be
explained by adaptation effects.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our experiments demonstrate that observers use knowledge of
an object’s color to recalibrate their color categories. This
finding has two important theoretical implications. First, it un-
dermines the assumption that language perception is funda-
mentally different from perception in other domains. Two earlier
experiments—investigating auditory and visual word recogni-
tion—showed similar top-down effects for phoneme and letter
categories (Norris, Butterfield, McQueen, & Cutler, 2006;
Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2003). Because recalibration of
categories also occurs in color perception, it is not unique to
language, but rather is a general perceptual strategy that lan-
guage processing takes advantage of (Dawkins, 1989, chap. 11;
Deacon, 1997, chap. 4).
Second, our results show that perception does make use of
top-down processing. This top-down processing is, however,
delayed. Immediate top-down influences would override the
perceptual evidence, and with such feedback, observers might
hallucinate and perceive unripe and overripe bananas as yellow.
Delayed feedback for learning prevents such illusions, but still
utilizes prior probabilities provided by world knowledge to
achieve perceptual constancy. We suggest that this mechanism
has evolved to strike an optimal balance between top-down and
bottom-up information in perception.
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